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Abstract
Practicing agriculture requires organisation and coordination. To analyse the extent to which
diﬀerences in agricultural practices can account for variation in social capital, a large survey containing
indicators of social capital is combined with detailed agricultural statistics. The main factor under
analysis is irrigation, together with prevalent grain sorts, thereby building on prior research. The
richness of the datasets allows to explore various dimensions of social capital in geographic detail and
their distribution among societal groups. Results reveal a significant negative influence of irrigation
on the prevalence of conflict and an increased likelihood for communal conflict solution strategies
within communities. These results are strongest for landholders working their own land, yet lose
significance when accounting for intra-district correlation. For other indicators of social capital such
as confidence and membership in organisations, the results are less conclusive, yet some interesting
relations emerge.
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1 Introduction
During the last three decades, economists’ interest in the notion of social capital as a fundamental factor
in economic production has risen steadily (Knack and Keefer (1997), Zak and Knack (2001), Guiso
et al. (2004), Tabellini (2010)) and its influence on economic development is increasingly acknowledged
(World Bank (2015)) At the same time, significant diﬀerences remain between countries and world regions
regarding their measured social capital “stock”, despite similar education and developmental achievements.
The drivers of these variations are not yet fully understood. A number of works (Henrich (2004); Cohen
et al. (1996); Alesina et al. (2011); Gneezy et al. (forthcoming)) have looked at the relation between our
ancestral means of subsistence, e.g. farming practices and hunting organisation, and the way we structure
our societies. Yet, irrigation as a fundamental characteristic of many agricultural societies has so far not
received adequate attention from an econometric perspective, even though its importance has already
been mentioned by Karl Marx (cited in Asche (1978)) and Wittfogel (1957). In the latter’s notion of
“hydraulic societies”, it is the need to harness the power of water for purposes of irrigation or in defense
of one’s home area that made ancient societies, e.g. in the Middle East, develop elaborate administrative
structures much earlier than societies living in geographically more advantaged world regions. More
recent work by Talhelm et al. (2014) has focused on the prevalence of wheat vs. rice in cultivation, where
the associated agricultural practices are thought to have a long-term impact on societal organisation.
The present study combines two datasets to add to this discussion for another world region, which is
India. The wealth of agricultural and personal data allows it to separate the eﬀects of grain sorts and
irrigation on diﬀerent indicators of social capital, both from a historic and current perspective. It finds
only limited evidence for diﬀerent types of grain cultivation as a crucial determinant, which might have
to do with the fact that the lines between cultivation practices between rice and non-rice are not as clear
cut as Talhelm et al. (2014) assumes them to be in China. Yet, it emerges that the share of irrigation has
strong and consistent predictive power on some indicators of social capital, especially for those directly
involved in the cultivation of their own land.
Various aspects of social capital, such as trust, network width or individualism/ collectivism, have
been analysed to explain diﬀerences in economic indicators such as growth, saving behavior or pros-
perity (e.g. Gorodnichenko and Roland (2011), Knack and Keefer (1997), Greif (1993), Narayan and
Pritchett (1999)). Often-cited definitions of social capital which also guide this present work come from
Bourdieu (1986) and Putnam (1993), where social capital is defined as “the aggregate of the actual or
potential ressources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized
relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition” (Bourdieu). For Putnam, the essential aspects are
”trust, norms and networks that can improve the eﬃciency of society by facilitating coordinated actions”.
While the importance of these concepts is firmly established in the economic literature, its persistent
diﬀerences between countries often remain unexplained. One prominent example is the socio-structural
divide between countries of the “West” and those of the “Far East”, where surveys of the former show
substantially higher measures of “individualism” versus a higher degree of “collectivism” in the latter
(Hofstede (2015)). For example, the six western countries of the G7 (USA, United Kingdom, France,
Italy, Germany, Canada) all rank under the Top 17 of 69 countries for which data is available (average
score 79 points on a 0-100 scale measuring individualism) whereas the main economies of the Far East
(Japan, China, Taiwan, South Korea) all rank lower than number 31 and score a much lower 25 points on
average. It is very interesting to note that this ranking seems to be not primarily determined by income,
wealth or education of a particular country, with Japan and South Korea ranking far below much poorer
nations such as Hungary or the Baltic States.
A recent study by Talhelm et al. (2014) makes a fundamental contribution in oﬀering a history-
based explanation for the roots of these persistent diﬀerences. In their study of Chinese students, those
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coming from areas with prevalent rice cultivation score significantly higher on measures of collectivism
than those from neighboring (and therefore assumed as otherwise identical) districts characterised by
wheat cultivation. The authors therefore conclude that the major importance of rice cultivation in
East Asia versus wheat cultivation in countries of the West is one fundamental reason for persistent
observable diﬀerences between these two world regions. More specifically, the authors hypothesize that
the specific demands of rice in cultivation (labor intensity and irrigation requirements) necessitate rice-
growing societies to act in a more coordinated and communal way than the comparative independence
of wheat cultivation.
In its basic argument, that the organisation of food production as the central occupation for the
majority of people until comparatively recently shaped societal behavior and organisational forms, the
present study follows other scholars that have explored this nexus. Notable examples include Henrich et al.
(2001)’s study of fifteen indogenous societies, which shows that the degree of cooperation required between
individuals during food acquisition is related to cooperation in experimental settings. A study with a
related approach comes from Gneezy et al. (forthcoming) who explore variations in cooperative behavior
in experiments with Brazilian fishermen, with one group fishing either at sea and another individually at
a nearby lake. Through a series of economic games, they find a strictly higher willingness to cooperate
among sea-fishers. There are also examples of social norm generation and transmission from agricultural
factors: a study from Cohen et al. (1996) relates today’s aggressive potentials of southerners in the USA
to the cultural heritage of British pastoralists who first settled today’s southern USA and were used to
having to defend their territory, wheras northerners trace their roots more frequently back to British
farmers, bringing with them a culture of cooperation and coordination. These results are confirmed by
Grosjean (2014), specifically in areas where historical institutional quality was low. Alesina et al. (2011)
find a correlation between today’s role of women in society and the historical onset of plough usage,
thereby building on a hypothesis from Boserup (1989), where physical exortion and lack of opportunity
for taking breaks when working with the plough prevented shared work on the field. A theory related
especially to the second hypothesis comes from Wittfogel (1957), whose term “hydraulic societies” implies
the central role of water harnessing in fostering a strong and eﬀective state. Early civilizations, such as the
Egyptians, Babylonians or the Indus valley culture therefore profited from their centralized structures,
which in turn were a result of the need to coordinate in water management. Regarding rice cultivation
and associated irrigation, besides the mentioned study by Talhelm et al. (2014), one relevant work for this
analysis comes from Tsusaka et al. (2015, in press). By combining survey, experimental and econometric
data, the authors show that the adoption of altruistic and cooperative behaviors is higher among farmers
practicing irrigation vis-à-vis rain-fed agriculture. For cooperative behavior, the neighborhood eﬀect is
stronger among farm plot neighbors than among residential neighbors, providing evidence for the binding
eﬀect of common labor in the field.
By combining two publicly available datasets, this present study correlates information on indicators
of social capital at the household level with agricultural statistics at the district level to inform the
debate on determinants of social capital. The depth of the data allows the separation between eﬀects
of crop choice, cultivation technique and individuals’ roles in the agricultural production. In trying to
capture historic agricultural patterns, the earliest available comprehensive data is used. Fortunately,
these series were initiated before or at least only during the early phases of the “Green Revolution” in
India. Furthermore, diﬀerent aspects of social capital i.e. confidence and membership in organisations
can be analysed separately with the data at hand, together with conflict and related solving strategies at
the village level. The case of India is important in this debate as it not only geographically, but arguably
also socially lies between the Western and Eastern hemisphere (Rank 29 in Hofstede-ranking, average
individualism score of 48) and its environment fostered the cultivation of various crops with diﬀering
methods, so that specific eﬀects of grain sort and cultivation method can be isolated. The relevance of
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this study can be understood when looking at recent large government initiatives like the one labelled
“Rurban” , which, in boosting rural infrastructure and services towards urban levels, might be facing very
diﬀerent social structures depending on what agricultural practices prevail in diﬀerent areas (Deccan
Chronicle (June 12, 2014), The Times of India (June 10, 2014)). The same holds true for a proposed
push in irrigation development (The Hindu (August 20th, 2014)). In the following, Section 2 gives an
overview on characteristics of grain cultivation in India and associated practices. Section 3 states the
main hypothesis, describes the dataset and introduces the econometric model. Section 4 presents the
results of various regressions, before Section 5 discusses these results and concludes.
2 Grain Cultivation in India
Cultivation of grains in India varies widely with the prevailing environmental conditions.1 The main
sorts in 19772 included rice (36% of total grain cultivation area), sorghum and millet (30,2%) and wheat
(18,2%). Areas of rice cultivation are to be found mainly along the coasts and the lower Ganges river,
whereas wheat sorghum and millet are cultivated in the drier and cooler areas of the Deccan Plateau,
the upper Gangetic plains and the Punjab. It is worth noting though that there are also areas, where
both rice and other grains are cultivated side by side, such as the Gangetic plains (for detailed maps, see
Annex, Figures 5-5). Another important observation for this study is that a large share of rice cultivation
(64% across India in 1971) takes place without irrigation. In these cases, rice may be cultivated either
relying on inundation through natural sources, or in dry cultivation. This holds especially true for
those areas receiving relatively reliable rainfall along the Western Coast and in the Gangetic plains. For
wheat, the observation might be surprising that a significant share (56%) of area under cultivation is
irrigated, especially in the Punjab and along the upper Ganges. These observations question the view
at the base of Talhelm et al. (2014)’s hypothesizing that rice cultivation is exclusively characterized by
irrigation, whereas wheat cultivation is a matter of mostly sowing and harvesting. Especially in areas of
rice cultivation under dry conditions, the step of seedling transplantation, which is crucial in irrigated
fields and leads to acute peaks in labor demand, would be absent, since rice seeds are thrown on the field
just as they are in wheat cultivation. This is the other feature of rice cultivation underlying Talhelm et
al. (2014)’s reasoning, that rice carries with it a higher demand of labor apart from irrigation works that
is not to be found in wheat cultivation. An impression is given by the required weekly working days for
the cultivation of 1ha of rice in a non-mechanized agriculture under irrigation techniques. It is evident
that to some extent the preparatory, but mainly the transplantation and harvesting periods require more
work than the family household can manage, especially when considering an average of 1.21ha/ holding
(excluding holdings larger than 10ha) from 1970 for Bihar, a rice-producing state (ICRISAT (2013)).
Until today, only a minority of rice fields exceed 1.5ha (Agriculture Census of India (2015)), with a mean
size of 1,1ha (again excluding the largest estates), which is minuscule compared to the largest corn or
wheat plantations in industrialized countries. This lack of industrialization and mechanisation is mainly
caused by the composition of soils and the location of rice fields along terraced terrain (Bray (1994);
Grist (1975)). Therefore, the absence of economies of scale contributes to a continuous labor-intensive
agriculture in many rice growing countries, and also prevents a rural exodus and alteration of rural
lifestyles as observed in many western countries.
In this light, it is not surprising that a number of labor sharing institutions have been devised by rice
cultivators in Asia, in order to cope with the high labor demand over short periods. These include wage
labor of lower for higher castes in India (a system that is said to stem in places from the first century
1Note: Most agronomic information in the following was taken from a publication by Rehm (1989). If other sources are
used, these are stated explicitly.
2Newer data are of course available, yet the earliest available comprehensive statistics will be used in the following,
accounting for the long-term manifestation of social behavior and avoiding possible recent shifts in cultivation patterns.
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Table 1: labor required for cultivation of 1ha of rice
Procedure Period (weeks) Working Days/Week(approx.)
Land preparation & set-up of seedling beds 5-6 7-14
Transplanting of seedlings 1,5-2 10-20
Weeding 5-7 3-8
Caretaking 13-15 0,7-1,5
Harvesting, Threshing, Cleaning, Storing 2 20-30
Total 26,5-32 4-8
Source: taken and adapted from Rehm (1989)
AD (Bohle (1981))) but also labor exchanges as have been documented in China (Bray (1994)), Malaysia
(Wong (1987)) and the Philippines (Sajor (2004)). These systems help to coordinate the labor in a given
geographical entity (often simply the village) during peak demand times by staggering plantation dates
and a reciprocity-based scheme, where all farmers help to finish one field, before all farmers work on
another field they do not necessarily own without any kind of payment. There seems to be a relative
scarcity of evidence for these labor exchanges in India, potentially because labor allocation is rather
caste-based and thereby not entirely voluntarily and cooperatively organised (Nakamura (1972)). An
interesting exception is to be found in the Tamil word “kaimath” (literally “hand exchange”) that is used
both for work in a labor exchange system but also the lending of money without asking for interest.
Generally though, it could be the case that communal organisations for rice cultivation are much less
prevalent in India than in countries further east, since cultivation techniques and societal organisation
diﬀer substantially. It has to be noted that labor exchanges were replaced by wage-based systems in
many Asian countries over the 20th century, mainly due to high population growth (Rao (1999)).
For sorghum and millet, many characteristics of cultivation are similar, so they will not be described
separately. In India, they are often cultivated side-by-side with vegetables or other cash crops and only
very rarely in irrigated systems. Traditionally, the seed is thrown or placed in rows in the soil of the drier
and cooler areas. These lie mainly in the Deccan Plateau of central southern India and the dry areas of
the West (see maps in Annex for details).
Wheat traditionally occupied around one fifth of the area under grain cultivation. Often, it is grown
over the winter, while the same fields are used for cash crops such as sugar cane or cotton during other
periods. There are also a number of areas where rice and wheat are grown interchangeably, or where
wheat is sown into irrigated furrows in vegetable fields. In 1996, such areas accounted for around a third
of all wheat cultivation in South Asia, of which again three quarters are grown under irrigation (Sayre
(2002)) Irrigated wheat fields can be found along the Himalaya and in the very dry areas of the west,
whereas unirrigated wheat is grown in central India.
The use of early accounts of agricultural production in the latter analysis is justified when looking at
Figure 1. A large number of districts have altered their patterns of grain cultivation considerably over
the last 40 years, as indicated by their position relative to the line. Notably, irrigation has increased in
a lot of districts. Probably linked to this is a shift in the grain sorts under cultivation, where rice and
most noticeably wheat increase at the cost of millet.
As already alluded to above, not only rice is grown under irrigation in India, but also wheat and
other grains. It is perhaps surprising to note that in 1977, i.e. already before the big increase in area
under irrigation, (only) 36% of rice fields were under irrigation, whereas 63% of wheat fields received
water artificially. Millet is very rarely grown under irrigation (only 4% of acreage irrigated, Agriculture
Census of India (2015)). Statistics do not include accounts of the amounts of water used in irrigation.
Yet, one can assume that any kind of irrigation, whatever its size, demands coordination, possible even
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Figure 1: Shares of grain sorts & irrigation within districts (1977-2005)
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with decreasing demands for bigger structures. Therefore, the actual amount of water used is only of
secondary importance.
There are a number of descriptive studies on historic irrigational practices in the case of India. Raghu-
vanshi (1995) describes the development of regional irrigation projects, complementing local microstruc-
tures starting already under colonial rule, which share water from where it is abundant with undersupplied
areas. In these, local distribution is still mostly organized by local groups. In northern India, this sys-
tem is called “warabandi”, which can be translated as “strict order” (after Bandaragoda and ur Rehman
(1995)). This entails an allocation of water to the farmer according to his field size, which in turn
determines the crop rotation of the farmer. An example for another system is the allocation of water
rights to all residents of a particular area by a third party, after which landless peasants can sell their
water rights. Bandaragoda and ur Rehman (1995) also state that the warabandi system was already in
place long before its institutionalisation by the British colonizers, and might in fact even date back to
the early Indus valley cultures. For southern India, Bardhan (2000) in his field study of 48 irrigation
communities finds an even share between the adoption of public systems and the renitence of traditional
ones, depending on the degree of water scarcity and duration of existence. In the traditional systems, he
reports that those with frequent meetings are characterized by less conflict. Coordination of labor and
work on the shared irrigation structures is coordinated centrally by a village assembly.
To sum up, there is a high variety of grain cultivation in India, and a non-monotonous relationship
of grain sort cultivated and irrigation.
3 Hypothesis, Data and Model
3.1 Hypothesis
As evident from the discussion of agricultural structures above, the clear distinction between rice farming,
characterized by periods of high labor demand and irrigation, and wheat farming, with low labor demands
and no irrigation, on which Talhelm et al. (2014) base their argument, cannot be made for India. Firstly,
wheat is actually grown more under irrigation than rice. Secondly, the high labor demands of rice are
only relevant when it is grown under irrigation, as it is only then that seedlings have to be planted in
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a short period of time. Yet, when rice seeds are sown into the field directly as it is under non-irrigated
cultivation that relies solely on rainfall (and not on inundation, where the case might be diﬀerent again),
there is no reason why this should entail a higher labor requirement than wheat cultivation. Therefore, it
might be that the eﬀect for rice that Talhelm et al. (2014) see in China is largely driven by the irrigation
that is clearly associated with rice cultivation there, whereas labor exchange plays a smaller role. For
India, the data does not allow to separate between areas where rice is grown under irrigation, natural
inundation or on dry fields, which would allow to test for a specific eﬀect of labor exchange practices.
Yet, if we find a positive eﬀect of irrigation on social capital regardless of the grain that is cultivated, this
should hint at an impact of the organisation surrounding irrigation, and not so much of the grain that
is cultivated. To test the hypothesis that the high labor demand of rice fosters cooperation, we can still
compare the impact of diﬀerent grain sorts, assuming that at least in some areas rice cultivation implies
labor coordination, and more so than the cultivation of other sorts. The main hypothesis to be tested
below is therefore:
H1: Irrigation should be fostering cooperation and trust, since the sharing and maintenance of
channels and other structures requires coordination and shared organisation.
This hypothesis is in its kind related to the other studies of a long-term societal impact of agriculture
mentioned in the introduction.
In addition to the regressions for the overall sample and in order to shed light on the question of norm
transmission and persistence, it will also be examined whether eﬀects diﬀer between those cultivating their
own holdings (land-holding agriculturalists”), those holding land without cultivating it (“land-holding non-
agriculturalists”) and those cultivating the land of others (“landless agriculturalists”). Following the above
reasoning, we would expect to see the strongest eﬀect of irrigation for those working their own land, with
lesser eﬀects (potentially through spillovers) for those with diﬀerent occupations from the same area.
H2: Irrigation should have the strongest eﬀect on indicators of social capital for those directly
engaged in cultivating their own fields.
Furthermore, the data can provide some insights whether rice itself has a positive eﬀect on social capital
through its related labor organisation. Yet, the caveats associated with this hypothesis demand a very
careful interpretation of the results for these estimates.
3.2 Data
To perform this analysis, two publicly available datasets are combined. The first, the India Household
Development Survey (hereafter IHDS, Desai et al. (2009)) has been compiled in the years 2004-2005 for a
representative sample of more than 40000 Indian households, asking them about a broad array of aspects
of their daily life. This dataset has been used widely by researchers such as Bros and Borooah (2013),
Vikram et al. (2012), Story (2014) and Vanneman et al. (2006) where the latter work is in its research
interest related to this present analysis. The authors find that indicators of social capital vary widely
across India, and show that diﬀerent measures are often not correlated among each other.
Within this study, out of the 945 variables, the ones concerning membership in organisations, conflicts
and their solution within the community and confidence in institutions are the most important and will
be used as indicators for social capital. The number of observations is slightly reduced from the overall
sample of 41554, owing to a lack of agricultural data for some minor states and territories (including
Jammu & Kashmir, Delhi, most north-eastern states and union territories), the exclusion of residents of
the six major metropolitan areas (Mumbai, Delhi, Bangalore, Chennai, Hyderabad, Kolkata), those who
have not lived more than 10 years in one place (2579 obs. of the remainder) and those where relevant
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information on indicators of social capital is missing (18 obs). The decision to leave out recent movers
was based on the assumption that people are influenced by the social norms of the area where they and
their parents come from and this relationship may be less evident with people who have recently moved
to other places. Since this is especially true for the big metropolises where agriculture has long since
ceased to play a role, these are excluded from the following analysis. The resulting sample size, for which
answers for at least one indicator of social capital were available is 32524 households, with an average
household size of 5,3 individuals. Since a number of questions on indicators of social capital, such as
whether any household member is in a specific association, are based on all household members, the
eﬀective size of the sample increases for these questions.
To separate the sample into agriculturalists and non-agriculturalists, the question regarding the main
source of income for the household was used. Here, the former are defined as those households where
cultivation, allied agriculture or agricultural labor were stated as the main sources of income. Non-
agriculturalists mostly comprise non-agricultural labor, salaried jobs, artisans and other minor groups.
Similarly, a direct question on land holdings of the household was used to diﬀerentiate between landowners
and the landless. The two dummies are combined to diﬀerentiate between landless and land-holding
agriculturalists and non-agriculturalists. Their respective shares are presented in Table 2.
Table 2: Numbers and Shares of Agriculturalists and Landowners
land=0 land=1 Total
agric=0 13333 (41%) 4699 (14%) 18032 (55%)
agric=1 3530 (11%) 10962 (34%) 14492 (45%)
Total 16863 (52%) 15661 (48%) 32524 (100%)
The richness of the dataset also provides a number of control variables which are included (but not
always reported) in the regressions below. On the household level, these include (the log of) stated
household income, caste status, average years of education of the oldest male and the oldest female in the
household and the type of residence (rural, urban, urban slum). Following Mauro (1995), ethnolinguistic
fractionalization is controlled for through a measure of the likelihood that two people from the same
principal sampling unit, the village or neighborhood, share the same language and religion. Neither
religion nor language by itself might be a suitable measure for ethinc group in India, where religious
groups transcend language borders and vice versa, which is why the two are combined. Further controls
on the district level are derived from statistics of the 2011 Census of India (Government of India (2011)).
These include the share of population for each of the main religions in India (Hinduism, Islam, Christian,
Sikhism, Buddhism, Jainism), the urbanisation rate and the share of illiterates.
The second dataset with the main explanatory variables is provided by the International Crops Re-
search Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (hereafter ICRISAT; ICRISAT (2013)). In its “Village Dy-
namics in South Asia” database (hereafter VDSA), yearly agricultural statistics based on oﬃcial records
are compiled for most Indian states on the district level, dating back as far as 1966. Detailed data on
the gross area under irrigation is used to determine the share of land in gross cultivated area. Further-
more, dummies were generated for each district that equal one when the share of the four main sorts
in cultivation (rice, wheat, millet, maize) exceeds one third of total grain cultivation. The decision was
taken not to use a continuous share variable for each sort, as for example the share of rice does not say
anything about whether the rest of the area is cultivated with wheat or millet, which might come with
diﬀerent cultivation practices. Therefore, these dummies measure the prevalence of a particular grain in
a given district. Throughout this study, only the relative importance grain cultivation within all grain
cultivation is measured, whereas other crops such as cotton, sugar or vegetables are excluded. This might
in some cases largely overestimate the actual share of grains in all cultivation, yet takes into account the
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assumed central role of grain cultivation and its probable predominance until not long ago.
Overall, the IHDS includes, after all stated exclusions, observations for 326 districts. These are
matched with information from the VDSA data. One point worth mentioning is that the VDSA is
compiled based on the district boundaries of 1966, in order to ensure comparability over time. In order
not to lose out on the districts separated from others after this date, it is assumed that the new districts
have the same agricultural features as their mother districts. In cases where one district has two (11 cases)
or three (one case) mother districts, the average of agricultural features of mother district was assumed
for the new ones. Reapportioning was done based on a publication by VDSA (Rao et al. (2012)).
One drawback of the Indian case as compared with the Chinese sample of Talhelm et al. (2014) is
its possibly higher ethnical heterogeneity. While Talhelm and his co-authors recruit students from a
narrowly defined geographical area with a shared language, ethnicity and cultural heritage, the present
sample covers 19 federal states, 12 oﬃcial languages and various cultural groups. To account for this
fact, all regressions are run with state-fixed eﬀects, thereby exploiting only within-state variation. The
range of districts per state ranges from 3 (Uttaranchal, 325 observations) to 31 (Uttar Pradesh, 3139
obs.) At least in southern and eastern India, where state borders are mostly drawn along language and
ethnic borders, this should rule out a number of problems related to omitted variables.
Following the concept of long-term manifestation of social norms, the earliest available comprehensive
accounts are used. In the VDSA data, these come from the year 1977.3 This date might not be as early
as one could wish for as it might not be reflecting earlier patterns of irrigation, yet as is evident from
data of the Agriculture Census of India (2015), the big push in infrastructural development of irrigation
structures in India only gathered momentum after 19774.
Out of the wealth of the IHDS survey, six measures for social capital are derived, which are in line with
diﬀerent dimensions of social capital as mentioned above. Details on the design of the indicators can be
found in 7 in the Annex. The first, hereafter the “Conflict Solution” indicator uses the results to a question
on whether water supply problems in a community are solved by each family individually (=0) or bond
together (=1). The answers are pooled at the village-/ neighborhood level as the principal sampling unit,
since the question does not relate to one’s own problem resolution strategy, but to that of the community.
Secondly, the “Level of Conflict” indicator is based on the answers to a question regarding the overall level
of conflict in the village or neighborhood on a scale from 1 to 3, where 1 denotes high levels of conflict.
Again, answers are pooled at the PSU-level. The third, hereafter the “Local Confidence” indicator states
the individual confidence in a local institution, i.e. the local assembly (“panchayat, nagarpalika”), again
on a scale from 1 to 3, where 1 denotes low confidence. Among the set of questions in the IHDS, this one
is singled out, as there is a direct link between local organisation and the above hypotheses on an eﬀect
of irrigation on local organisation. A more general indicator regarding confidence ( “General Confidence”
indicator) is an index based on a number of questions eliciting confidence towards diﬀerent public and
private instiutions. This index is predicted via the average z-score of the answers. In addition and
following one of the main strands of literature on social capital, membership in organisations is looked
at in the “Local Membership” indicator. This equals one if any member of the household is member in
at least one of four community-based organisations. Finally, the attendance of a public meeting by any
of the household members is examined in the “Attend Public Meeting“ indicator. In all specifications,
the higher value for the dependent variable indicates a “higher amount” of social capital. In this way,
interpretation of positive or negative coeﬃcients can be done intuitively.
3Data for 1977 was not available for the state of Assam, where the series started only in 2006. Therefore, the data for
1977 was taken from that year.
418% of total area under cultivation irrigated in 1970-71; 19% in 1976-77; 25% in 1985-86; 44% in 1996-97; 47% in
2005-06)
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3.3 Model
The basic model with fixed eﬀects estimated in the below regressions therefore takes the form
SCi =  0 + ↵j +  1irrigationk +  2Dk +  3ELFl +  4Xi +  5Zk + "i
where i={32524 households), j={19 federal states}, k= {326 districts} and l={2078 PSUs}. SC de-
notes the dependent indicator of social capital, ↵j the state fixed-eﬀect  1 and  2 the coeﬃcients of
interest, Dk the set of dummies for the main sorts of grain cultivated,  3ELFl the measure of ethnolin-
guistic fractionalization within the PSU,  4X a matrix of control variables on the household level with
the respective coeﬃcients,  5Z a matrix of control variables on the district level with the respective
coeﬃcients and "i the robust error term. Depending on the coding of the dependent variable, OLS or
logit-regression models are used. In additional regressions shown below, the standard errors are clustered
on the district level to account for intra-district correlation.
Descriptive statistics for dependent and explanatory variables can be found in Table 5 in the Annex.
It is evident that the indicators for social capital vary quite strongly between agriculturalists and non-
agriculturalists for some indicators. Furthermore, the sample is nicely split between these two groups,
and all indicators present relatively high variance.
4 Results
In the following three tables, the results for the six selected indicators are shown. All regressions are
estimated with fixed eﬀects at the state level. In all cases a first specification looks at the relevant eﬀects
for the whole sample, whereas the second specification diﬀerentiates between landless laborers, land-
holding non-agriculturalists, and farmers on their own land, and the respective influence of irrigation.
The third specification replicates the second but uses standard errors clustered at the district level. When
the answers are coded 0 or 1 (i.e. for the “Local Membership” and the “Attend Public Meeting” indicators)
the logit model is specified as described above, whereas for the continous or pooled answers a standard
OLS model is applied. Since the primary goal of this analysis is not to quantify eﬀects of compare them
between indicators (which would make little sense with answers that are rather subjective), these two
diﬀerent specifications should be no further cause for concern. It is worth noting for the dummies that
the reference category is maize cultivation in all specifications. As this grain is relatively unimportant,
it suﬃces to compare the coeﬃcients of the three main grain sorts.
For the level of conflict in Table 3, the analysis in columns (1) and (2) reveals a picture in support
of H1 on the influence of irrigation on social capital. The irrigation variable has a significantly positive
eﬀect in the first specification, indicating a lower prevalence of conflict in communities where irrigation is
important. Here, rice cultivation is associated with a relatively low conflict prevalence, compared to the
other main grain sorts, especially wheat. When looking at diﬀerent sub-groups, there is no evidence in
support of H2 for diﬀerential eﬀects of irrigation among them. Regarding the other controls, income and
ELF display the expected signs, whereas education has no influence on the indicator. Since an average of
15.6 (sd=6.5) people were interviewed per sampled neighborhood or village, a representative impression
of conflict within the given community can be assumed. When accounting for intra-district correlation
in (3), the results change though. None of the main explanatory variables has a significant explanatory
power anymore, hinting at a high correlation of answers within districts. It is worth noting though that
the influence of irrigation is close to a significance level of 10%.
For the solution of local conflicts in Table 3, columns (4)-(6), the results reveal a strong and precisely
estimated positive eﬀect for irrigation in line with H1. The more irrigation is practised, the higher the
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Table 3: Level of Conflict & Conflict Solution
Level of Conflict Conflict Solution
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
irrigation 0.351 0.328 0.328 0.044 0.145 0.145
(0.023)*** (0.027)*** (0.214) (0.015)*** (0.017)*** (0.123)
d.rice -0.056 -0.057 -0.057 -0.031 -0.030 -0.030
(0.022)** (0.022)** (0.180) (0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.077)
d.wheat 0.148 0.149 0.149 0.084 0.085 0.085
(0.020)*** (0.020)*** (0.158) (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.062)
d.millet -0.067 -0.067 -0.067 0.030 0.033 0.033
(0.023)*** (0.023)*** (0.188) (0.010)*** (0.010)*** (0.064)
income 0.006 0.006 0.006 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.003)* (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.002)
education 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
ELF -0.050 -0.053 -0.053 0.008 0.009 0.009
(0.016)*** (0.016)*** (0.085) (0.010) (0.010) (0.047)
irri*agric 0.017 0.017 -0.219 -0.219
(0.035) (0.105) (0.024)*** (0.082)***
agric 0.004 0.004 0.025 0.025
(0.015) (0.040) (0.010)*** (0.027)
irri*land 0.059 0.059 -0.175 -0.175
(0.043) (0.135) (0.026)*** (0.074)**
land -0.033 -0.033 0.050 0.050
(0.014)** (0.045) (0.008)*** (0.024)**
irri*agric*land -0.039 -0.039 0.258 0.258
(0.057) (0.125) (0.036)*** (0.076)***
agric*land 0.002 0.002 -0.055 -0.055
(0.020) (0.043) (0.012)*** (0.026)**
R2 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.20 0.21 0.21
N 32,490 32,489 32,489 32,490 32,489 32,489
SE Robust Robust Clustered Robust Robust Clustered
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
probability for a shared solution of community problems. Higher conflict levels as measured by the
pooled subjective answers used as a dependent variable in the “Level of Conflict”-specification, lower this
probability significantly (unreported). Looking at the main sorts cultivated, again rice cultivating districts
display relatively low levels of this indicator of social capital. In the second column, it becomes obvious
that the eﬀect for irrigation diﬀers quite dramatically between the various groups, lending support to
H2. In reference to landless non-farm workers, the eﬀect of irrigation for landless farmers is even negative
and close to zero for land-holding non-agriculturalists. Yet, the eﬀect is stronger and highly significant
for farmers holding land. This result persists when using district-clustered standard errors. For this
indicator, only the log of income has a significant, negative influence.
The results for the indicator for membership in local organisations are presented in Table 4. Here,
a somewhat contradictory result emerges. Irrigation does not have an eﬀect on the probability for
membership in a community-oriented organisation in the first specification and for none of the groups in
the second, whereas rice cultivation seems to have a relatively positive influence vis-à-vis wheat on the
indicator. Accounting for intra-district correlation increases the standard errors drastically. The results
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Table 4: Membership & Attendance
Local Membership Attend Public Meeting
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
irrigation -0.105 -0.193 -0.193 0.068 0.206 0.206
(0.143) (0.180) (0.457) (0.119) (0.149) (0.409)
d.rice -0.042 0.004 0.004 -0.357 -0.321 -0.321
(0.121) (0.122) (0.324) (0.121)*** (0.121)*** (0.254)
d.wheat -0.225 -0.224 -0.224 -0.494 -0.502 -0.502
(0.106)** (0.105)** (0.246) (0.109)*** (0.109)*** (0.195)***
d.millet -0.156 -0.168 -0.168 -0.343 -0.382 -0.382
(0.118) (0.118) (0.333) (0.117)*** (0.117)*** (0.249)
income 0.052 0.060 0.060 0.040 0.050 0.050
(0.011)*** (0.010)*** (0.014)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.011)***
education 0.067 0.065 0.065 0.047 0.045 0.045
(0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.006)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.005)***
ELF 0.076 0.149 0.149 -0.384 -0.306 -0.306
(0.091) (0.092) (0.188) (0.083)*** (0.083)*** (0.192)
irri*agric 0.015 0.015 -0.320 -0.320
(0.243) (0.396) (0.200) (0.457)
agric 0.128 0.128 0.370 0.370
(0.083) (0.124) (0.076)*** (0.117)***
irri*land 0.252 0.252 -0.411 -0.411
(0.282) (0.395) (0.228)* (0.360)
land 0.227 0.227 0.431 0.431
(0.083)*** (0.118)* (0.074)*** (0.126)***
irri*agric*land -0.188 -0.188 0.492 0.492
(0.373) (0.470) (0.302) (0.507)
agric*land 0.072 0.072 -0.148 -0.148
(0.112) (0.138) (0.100) (0.144)
N 32,439 32,439 32,439 32,445 32,444 32,444
SE Robust Robust Clustered Robust Robust Clustered
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
on this indicator suggests a fundamental diﬀerence between it and the ones studied before, as it is strongly
correlated to income and education, but not to any agricultural indicators.
Regarding the attendance of public meetings, the evidence for an impact of irrigation is not entirely
conclusive. Irrigation does not aﬀect the indicator in general, yet it does so at a low significance level for
land-owning farmers. Here, rice cultivation seems to foster contribution to social organisations, relative to
the other grain sorts, yet not by a large margin. It is worth noting that in this set, non-farming landowners
and landless farmers are significantly more likely to be part of organisations and attend public meetings,
as indicated by the eﬀect of the dummy-variables. In column (3), only the wheat-dummy displays a
strong negative influence on the indicator among the grain dummies. Furthermore, the positive eﬀect for
the two aforementioned groups is still visible.
Table 4 presents the results for the confidence indicators. Irrigation levels in 1977 have no eﬀect
on the confidence in the local assembly when looking at the full sample, and no significant eﬀect when
diﬀerentiating between agriculturalists and non-agriculturalists. It has to be noted though that the eﬀect
for land-holding farmers is close to weak significance and points in the right direction. Individuals from
districs cultivating rice in 1977 show higher confidence in local institutions compared to millet cultivation,
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Table 5: Confidence in general and local institutions
Local Confidence General Confidence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
irrigation 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.021 0.032 0.032
(0.036) (0.043) (0.114) (0.026) (0.030) (0.101)
d.rice 0.019 0.020 0.020 -0.049 -0.056 -0.056
(0.033) (0.033) (0.097) (0.024)** (0.024)** (0.079)
d.wheat 0.059 0.056 0.056 0.017 0.010 0.010
(0.031)* (0.031)* (0.086) (0.022) (0.022) (0.071)
d.millet -0.086 -0.087 -0.087 -0.105 -0.110 -0.110
(0.031)*** (0.031)*** (0.084) (0.022)*** (0.022)*** (0.068)
income 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
(0.003)* (0.003)* (0.003) (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.003)**
education 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)**
ELF -0.061 -0.062 -0.062 -0.066 -0.067 -0.067
(0.023)*** (0.023)*** (0.054) (0.017)*** (0.017)*** (0.049)
irri*agric -0.025 -0.025 0.122 0.122
(0.061) (0.109) (0.044)*** (0.072)*
agric -0.080 -0.080 -0.115 -0.115
(0.023)*** (0.035)** (0.018)*** (0.033)***
irri*land -0.058 -0.058 -0.097 -0.097
(0.065) (0.090) (0.046)** (0.070)
land 0.008 0.008 0.013 0.013
(0.021) (0.028) (0.016) (0.023)
irri*agric*land 0.146 0.146 -0.052 -0.052
(0.091) (0.125) (0.065) (0.089)
agric*land 0.053 0.053 0.102 0.102
(0.031)* (0.039) (0.023)*** (0.033)***
R2 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.06
N 32,038 32,037 32,037 32,424 32,423 32,423
SE Robust Robust Clustered Robust Robust Clustered
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
yet no diﬀerential eﬀect towards wheat cultivation. Finally, the indicator for general confidence correlates
negatively with rice and especially millet cultivation, and is found to be strongly influenced by income,
education and ethnolinguistic fractionalization. Irrigation has a significant positive eﬀect for landless
laborers and a negative one for non-farming landowners. For land-holding farmers, the eﬀect is not
diﬀerent from the reference category.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
The results provide mixed evidence for the two hypotheses on irrigation fostering cooperation. The results
are relatively clear and intuitive for the conflict parameters, where irrigation increases the probability for
low levels of conflict for all the groups. Regarding the conflict solution mechanism, the results strongly
support H1 and H2 since the eﬀect of irrigation is most clerly seen among land-holding farmers. The
picture is less clear for the variables on participation in local institutions. In both specifications, irrigation
has no visible eﬀect for all or most of the groups, yet irrigational practice increases the probability of
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attendance of a public meeting for land-holding farmers significantly. Finally, irrigation does not have
a clear eﬀect on confidence in general and confidence in local institutions, even though landless farmers
display greater general confidence when irrigation is practiced. The diﬀerent outcomes for the various
indicators align with the already mentioned results of Vanneman et al. (2006), underlining the need to
look at indicators separately and the necessity to abstain from generalisations.
It clearly has to be noted though that the result depend strongly on the choice of the econometric
method. Even though a number of controls (state-fixed eﬀects, district-level controls) have been used,
this does not reduce the influence of intra-district correlation on the results. Yet, the finding remains that
results point in the direction of the main hypothesis for the indicators in Table 3 and for the attendance
of public meetings.
Furthermore, there is both supporting and conflicting evidence for Talhelm et al. (2014)’s rice theory
of culture. Whereas communities in rice cultivating districts display relatively low levels of conflict,
the grain sort does not clearly influence the conflict solving strategies. Rice cultivation seems to have
a relatively positive eﬀect on membership and attendance, but seems to decrease confidence in local
institutions and the likelihood for a peaceful village environment. In general, the Indian case does not
seem to support the rice theory, as its two main causal factors, labor exchanges and irrigation, are, in
the first case, not broadly documented and might be replaced by caste-based labor coordination, and, in
the second case, are clearly not a sole attribute of rice cultivation, but also of wheat cultivation.
Regarding the persisting socio-cultural divide between East and West, this study can be informative
on the role of irrigation, which could potentially also be seen as one of the fundamental diﬀerences between
the two world regions. Yet, in interpreting the results, it should mostly be seen as a study of the Indian
case, as Indian agriculture and the subcontinent itself is very heterogenous.
Overall, it can be noted that relations between irrigation and grain cultivation can be established for
some indicators related to social capital in India, yet the evidence is not conclusive for all indicators and is
not very robust to diﬀerent econometric specifications. On the one hand, this clearly highlights the need to
look at various dimensions of social capital (such as social norms, membership or confidence) separately
and not to lump them together. On the other hand, further studies, perhaps in a more controlled
environment or on the micro-level could be instructive to understand drivers of societal organisation in
India. For development measures on the individual or community level to be relevant, the latter clearly
has to be taken into account, which is why a deeper understanding of drivers and diﬀerences of social
capital is necessary.
14
References
Agriculture Census of India, “Agriculture Census of India 1970-2006,”
http://agcensus.nic.in/document.html 2015.
Alesina, Alberto, Paola Giuliano, and Nathan Nunn, “On the Origins of Gender Roles: Women
and the Plough,” National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper, 2011, (17098).
Asche, Helmut, “Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Oekonomie (Rohentwurf),” in “in,” VSA-Verlag,
1978.
Bandaragoda, D. J. and Saeed ur Rehman, “Warabandi in Pakistan’s canal irrigation systems:
Widening gap between theory and practice,” International Irrigation Management Institute Country
Paper, Pakistan, 1995, (7).
Bardhan, Pranab, “Irrigation and Cooperation: An Empirical Analysis of 48 Irrigation Communities
in South India,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, 2000, 48 (4), 847–866.
Bohle, Hans-Georg, “Bewaesserung und Gesellschaft im Cauvery-Delta (Suedindien) - Eine geographis-
che Untersuchung ueber historische Grundlagen und juengere Auspraegung struktureller Unterentwick-
lung,” Geographische Zeitschrift, 1981, 57.
Boserup, Ester, Woman’s Role in Economic Development, Earthscan, 1989.
Bourdieu, Pierre, “The forms of capital,” in John G. Richardson, ed., Handbook of Theory and Reseach
for the Sociology of Education, Greenwood Press, 1986, chapter 9, pp. 241–258.
Bray, Francesca, The Rice Economies: Technology and Development in Asian Societies, University of
California Press, 1994.
Bros, Catherine and Vani K Borooah, “Confidence in Public Bodies, and Electoral Participation in
India,” European Journal of Development Research, 2013, 25 (4), 557–583.
Cohen, Dov, Richard E. Nisbett, Brian F. Bowdle, and Norbert Schwarz, “Insult, aggression,
and the southern culture of honor: An ’experimental ethnography’.,” Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 1996, 70 (5), 945–960.
Deccan Chronicle, “Narendra Modi’s "rurban" way for agriculture,” June 12, 2014. last visited on
30.7.2014.
Desai, Sonalde, Amaresh Dubey, B.L. Joshi, Mitali Sen, Abusaleh Shariﬀ, and Reeve D.
Vanneman, “India Human Development Survey: Design and Data Quality,” Technical Paper 1, Uni-
versity of Maryland 2009.
Gneezy, Uri, Andreas Leibbrandt, and John A. List, “Ode to the sea: Workplace organisations
and norms of cooperation,” Economic Journal, forthcoming.
Gorodnichenko, Yuriy and Gerard Roland, “Individualism, innovation, and long-run growth,” Pro-
ceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 2011, 108 (S4), 21316–21319.
Government of India, “Census of India,” http://www.censusindia.gov.in 2011.
Greif, Avner, “Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi
Traders’ Coalition,” American Economic Review, 1993, 83 (3), 525–548.
Grist, Donald H., Rice, Longman, 1975.
15
Grosjean, Pauline, “A history of Violence: The culture of honor and homicide in the US South,”
Journal of the European Economic Assocation, October 2014, 12 (5), 1285–1316.
Guiso, Luigi, Paola Sapienza, and Luigi Zingales, “The role of social capital in financial develop-
ment,” American Economic Review, June 2004, 94 (3), 526–556.
Henrich, Joseph, Foundations of human socsocial - economic experiments and ethnographic evidence
from fifteen small-scale societies, 1 ed., Oxford Univ Press, 2004.
, Robert Boyd, Samuel Bowles, Colin Camerer, Ernst Fehr, Herbert Gintis, and Richard
McElreath, “In Search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies,”
American Economic Review, 2001, 91, 73–78.
Hofstede, Geert, “Research and VSM,” http://geerthofstede.eu/research–vsm 2015.
ICRISAT, “VDSA Database,” http://vdsa.icrisat.ac.in/vdsa-database.htm 2013.
Knack, Stephen and Philipp Keefer, “Does Social Capital have an economic payoﬀ? A cross-country
investigation,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1997, 112 (4), 1251–88.
Mauro, Paulo, “Corruption and Growth,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, August 1995, 110 (3),
681–712.
Nakamura, Hisashi, “Village Community and Paddy Agriculture in South India,” The Developing
Economies, 1972, 10 (2), 141–165.
Narayan, Deepa and Lant Pritchett, “Cents and Sociability: Household Income and Social Capital
in Rural Tanzania,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, 1999, 47 (4), 871–897.
Putnam, Robert D., Making Democracy Work, Princeton University Press, 1993.
Raghuvanshi, C. S., Management and Organisation of Irrigation System, Atlantic Publishers and
Distributors, 1995.
Rao, Mohan J., “Agrarian power and unfree labour,” Journal of Peasant Studies, 1999, 26 (2-3), 242–
262.
Rao, P. Parthasarathy, E. Jagadeesh, and L. M. Pandey, District Level Database Documentation
ICRISAT 2012.
Rehm, Sigmund, Handbuch der Landwirtschaft und Ern"ahrung in den Entwicklungsl"andern, 2 ed.,
Ulmer, 1989.
Sajor, Edsel E., “Are they Incompatible? Modern Farming and Non-Market Labour in the Northern
Philippine Uplands,” in Ratna Saipuri Becky Elmhirst, ed., Labour in Southeast Asia: Local Processes
in a Globalised World, Routledge, 2004, chapter 6, pp. 157–187.
Sayre, K.D., “Management of irrigated wheat,” in B.C. Curtis, S. Rajaram, and H. Gomez Macpherson,
eds., Bread Wheat - Improvement and Production, FAO Plant Production and Protection Series, Food
and agricultural organisation, 2002.
Story, William T., “Social Capital and the utilization of maternal and child health services in India: A
multilevel analysis,” Health & Place, 2014, 28, 73–84.
Tabellini, Guido, “Culture and institutions: Economic development in the regions of Europe,” Journal
of the European Economic Assocation, June 2010, 8 (4), 677–716.
16
Talhelm, Thomas, X. Zhang, Shige Oishi, C. Shimin, D. Duan, X. Lan, and S. Kitayama,
“Large-Scale Psychological Diﬀerences Within China Explained by Rice Versus Wheat Agriculture,”
Science, 2014, 344 (6184), 603–608.
The Hindu, “Modi announces new irrigation scheme,” The Hindu, August 20th, 2014.
The Times of India, “Govt to scale up ’rurban’ infrastructure,” June 10, 2014.
Tsusaka, Takuji W., Kei Kajisa, Valerien O. Pede, and Keitaro Aoyagi, “Neighborhood Eﬀects
and Social Behavior: The Case of Irrigated and Rainfed Farmers in Bohol, The Phillipines,” Journal
of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2015, in press.
Vanneman, Reeve D., James Noon, and Sonalde Desai, “Social Capital in India: Networks,
Organizations, and Confidence,” India Human Development Survey, Working Paper, 2006, 4.
Vikram, Kriti, Reeve Vanneman, and Sonalde Desai, “Linkages between maternal education and
childhood immunization in India,” Social Science & Medicine, 2012, 75 (2), 331–339.
Wittfogel, Karl A., Oriental Despotism - a comparative study of total power, Yale University Press,
1957.
Wong, Diana, Peasants in the Making: Malaysia’s Green Revolution, Institute of Southeast Asian
Studies, 1987.
World Bank, Mind, Society and Behavior - World Development Report 2015, World Bank Group, 2015.
Zak, Paul J. and Stephen Knack, “Trust and Growth,” The Economic Journal, Apr 2001, 111 (470),
295–321.
17
Ta
bl
e
6:
D
es
cr
ip
ti
ve
St
at
is
ti
cs
Fu
ll
sa
m
pl
e
A
gr
ic
ul
tu
ra
lis
ts
N
on
-A
gr
ic
ul
tu
ra
lis
ts
La
nd
ow
ne
r
La
nd
le
ss
V
ar
ia
bl
e
O
bs
M
ea
n
St
d.
D
ev
.
R
an
ge
O
bs
M
ea
n
O
bs
M
ea
n
O
bs
M
ea
n
O
bs
M
ea
n
D
ep
en
de
nt
V
ar
ia
bl
es
C
on
fli
ct
So
lu
ti
on
32
52
5
0.
58
1
0.
32
1
[0
;1
]
14
49
2
0.
56
0
18
03
3
0.
59
7
15
66
1
0.
59
1
16
86
3
0.
57
1
Lo
ca
lC
on
fli
ct
32
52
5
2.
39
3
0.
54
1
[1
;3
]
14
49
2
2.
38
9
18
03
3
2.
39
6
15
66
1
2.
36
16
86
3
2.
42
3
M
em
be
rs
hi
p
32
47
4
0.
23
1
0.
42
2
[0
;1
]
14
46
4
0.
26
0
18
01
0
0.
20
8
15
63
6
0.
25
8
16
83
8
0.
20
6
A
tt
en
d
P
ub
lic
M
ee
ti
ng
32
48
0
0.
30
1
0.
45
9
[0
;1
]
14
47
1
0.
36
8
18
00
9
0.
24
7
15
64
3
0.
38
3
16
83
6
0.
22
5
G
en
er
al
C
on
fid
en
ce
32
52
5
-0
.0
1
0.
53
8
[-1
.3
9;
2.
66
]
14
46
9
-0
.0
23
17
99
0
0.
00
0
15
63
5
0.
03
4
16
82
3
-0
.0
11
Lo
ca
lC
on
fid
en
ce
32
07
3
2.
16
3
0.
72
2
[1
;3
]
14
31
7
2.
19
0
17
75
6
2.
14
1
15
47
9
2.
20
1
16
59
3
2.
12
6
E
xp
la
na
to
ry
V
ar
ia
bl
es
ir
ri
ga
ti
on
32
52
5
0.
26
6
0.
21
4
[0
;0
.9
4]
14
49
2
0.
24
9
18
03
3
0.
27
9
15
66
1
0.
23
8
16
86
3
0.
29
2
du
m
m
y_
ri
ce
32
52
5
0.
35
7
0.
47
9
[0
;1
]
14
49
2
0.
32
8
18
03
3
0.
38
1
15
66
1
0.
33
6
16
86
3
0.
37
7
du
m
m
y_
w
he
at
32
52
5
0.
20
7
0.
40
5
[0
;1
]
14
49
2
0.
19
2
18
03
3
0.
21
9
15
66
1
0.
21
8
16
86
3
0.
20
0
du
m
m
y_
m
ill
et
32
52
5
0.
40
0
0.
49
0
[0
;1
]
14
49
2
0.
49
8
18
03
3
0.
35
1
15
66
1
0.
39
1
16
86
3
0.
40
7
18
Annex
Figure 2: Rice Cultivation as Share of Total Area under Grain Cultivation
Figure 3: Wheat Cultivation as Share of Total Area under Grain Cultivation
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Figure 4: Millet Cultivation as Share of Total Area under Grain Cultivation
Figure 5: Irrigated Area as Share of Total Area under Cultivation
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Table 7: Indicators of social capital
Indicator Original Question Coding
Level of
Conflict
In this village/ neighborhood, do people generally get along with
each other or is there some conflict or a lot of conflict? 1= A lot; 2=Some;3=Get Along
Conflict
Solution
In some communities, when there is a water supply problem, people
bond together to solve the problem. In other communities, people
take care of their own families individually. What is your
community like?
0=Each family
individually;
1=Bond together
Local
Membership
Does anybody in the household belong to [any of] a (1) self help
group, (2) credit or savings group, (3) development group of NGO,
(4) agricultural, milk, or other co-operative?
0=No; 1=Yes
Attend Public
Meeting
Have you or anyone in the household attended a public meeting
called by the village panchayat/nagarpalika/ward committee in the
last year?
0=No; 1= Yes
Local
Confidence
Confidence in village panchayats / nagarpalika to implement public
projects
1=Hardly any;
2=Only some; 3=A
great deal
General
Confidence
(1) Confidence in politicians to fulfill promises; (2) Confidence in
military to defend the country; (3) Confidence in the police to
enforce the law; (4) Confidence in the state goverment to look after
the people; (5) Confidence in newspapers to print the truth; (6)
Confidence in village panchayats / nagarpalika to implement public
projects; (7) Confidence in schools to provide good education; (8)
Confidence in hospitals and doctors to provide good treatment; (9)
Confident in courts to meet out justice; (10) Confidence in banks to
keep money safe
1=Hardly any;
2=Only some; 3=A
great deal
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